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Abstract
While policy attention is understandably diverted to COVID-19, the end of the UK’s post-Brexit ‘transi-
tion period’ remains 31 December 2020. All forms of future EU−UK relationship are worse for health
than EU membership, but analysis of the negotiating texts shows some forms are better than others.
The likely outcomes involve major negative effects for NHS staffing, funding for health and social care,
and capital financing for the NHS; and for UK global leadership and influence. We expect minor negative
effects for cross border healthcare (except in Northern Ireland); research collaboration; and data sharing,
such as the Early Warning and Response System for health threats. Despite political narratives, the legal
texts show that the UK seeks de facto continuity in selected key areas for pharmaceuticals, medical devices,
and equipment [including personal protective equipment (PPE)], especially clinical trials, pharmacovigi-
lance, and batch-testing. The UK will be excluded from economies of scale of EU membership, e.g. joint
procurement programmes as used recently for PPE. Above all, there is a major risk of reaching an agree-
ment with significant adverse effects for health, without meaningful oversight by or input from the UK
Parliament, or other health policy stakeholders.
Keywords: Brexit; cross border healthcare; EU; NHS; UK
1. Introduction
COVID-19 is likely to dominate the health policy agenda for most of 2020 and some time beyond.
As a consequence, there is a risk that attention is diverted from other important issues, some hav-
ing implications for the UK’s ability to mount an effective response to the pandemic. The UK
government faces the twin challenges of designing and implementing a response to one of the
most severe COVID-19 situations in Europe while negotiating its future relationship(s) with
the EU. How can it secure the ‘least worst’ outcomes for health and the NHS? The worst out-
comes for health have been avoided so far, by the entry into force of the Withdrawal
Agreement on 1 February 2020, a formal international treaty that establishes a transition period
during which the UK is no longer an EU Member State but both parties agree to apply most EU
law and policy as if it were. However, this period is scheduled to end on 31 December 2020, by
which time the EU and UK should have concluded negotiations on their future relationship and
agreed one or more legal texts. Despite the disruption caused by the spread of the virus and
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increasing voices calling for an extension to the transition period, the UK government has
rejected asking for one and, as things currently stand, the UK’s relationship with the EU will
be on a ‘No Deal’ basis if an agreement is not in place by 31 December 2020.
While the EU−UK agreement(s) will primarily concern trade, with health a peripheral matter
at best, trade agreements have important consequences for health (Gleeson and Labonte, 2019),
and, as our previous analyses showed (Fahy et al., 2017, 2019) although all forms of Brexit are bad
for health, some forms are worse than others.
This analysis considers the formal negotiating positions of the EU and the UK. The European
Commission’s negotiating mandate, annexed to the Council Decision 2020/226 of 28 February
2020, was agreed by the Council of the 27 Member States, having been debated by the
European Parliament on 12 February 2020. The mandate formally binds the European
Commission in its negotiations, subject to any further instructions from the Council. The EU
is negotiating with the UK under its general ‘external relations’ powers, using a procedure
which gives power both to the European Parliament and to domestic parliaments in the 27
Member States. The EU’s position is that it is seeking ‘a new partnership agreement’ with the
UK, which will be treated as a ‘third country’ post-transition. A draft EU text for the new part-
nership agreement was published by the European Commission’s Task Force for Relations with
the UK on 18 March 2020 (European Commission, 2020b).
The UK’s negotiating position is not contained in legislation, has not been debated by legis-
latures in Westminster, Belfast, Cardiff or Edinburgh, and may, legally speaking, be changed by
the UK government as it chooses. The UK’s position is contained in a written ministerial state-
ment given by Prime Minister Johnson to the UK Parliament on 3 February 2020, in Command
Paper 211 published on 27 February 2020 (HM Government, 2020d), and in a draft legal text
published on 19 May 2020 (HM Government, 2020b). The UK’s position is that it is seeking a
‘comprehensive free trade agreement’ with the EU, along with a number of other supplementary
agreements, some of which would be relevant for health in the UK.
The formal negotiations began in the first week of March 2020, but were temporarily halted in
mid-March, when both chief negotiators, Michel Barnier and David Frost, tested positive for
COVID-19. Negotiations restarted, using online communications, in mid-April 2020. This leaves
a short window of opportunity during which the implications for health of any agreement should
be understood by health policy stakeholders, and appropriate engagement with government (and
the EU) should take place.
2. Method
As in our 2017 and 2019 papers, our method uses the WHO’s health system building blocks to
assess the likely effects on each aspect of the NHS in the UK. We have slightly modified this ana-
lytical frame to disaggregate a few topics which were previously considered together. This is
necessary because of the way that implications of Brexit for health have unfolded. We focus
on the two negotiating positions: the annex to EU Council Decision 2020/266 of 28 February
2020, and the UK Command Paper 211 of February 2020. Where the draft legal texts illuminate
the negotiating positions, we have included those in our analysis.
We first examine and classify the compatibility of the negotiating positions: compatible, so
agreement likely (green); basic aims compatible but differences mean agreement uncertain
(yellow); no agreement likely because of fundamental incompatibility of aims (red) (Table 1, col-
umn 5). From that, we extrapolate a likely outcome for the agreement (Table 1, column 6), and
then explain the likely short-term impact on health and the NHS (Table 1, column 7). We cat-
egorise these effects as unchanged (grey); positive (green); moderate negative (pink); major nega-
tive (red). To reach this conclusion, we are also comparing with our previous analysis of the
Political Declaration (Fahy et al., 2019), also categorised as unchanged (grey); positive (green);
moderate negative (pink); major negative (red) (Table 1, column 2), as against the comparative
2 Nick Fahy et al.
baseline of the UK remaining in the EU. As noted, we are working from the available political and
legal texts, but of course the meanings and significance of those texts have not been tested.
In this analysis, we are focusing only on the short-term effects in the months immediately
post-transition (2021 into 2022), for health and social care in the UK. We have considered effects
on health in the EU elsewhere (Hervey et al., 2021). We have included possible interactions of the
effects of COVID-19 with the effects of the UK leaving the EU. Longer-term effects involve too
many other considerations to allow a meaningful analysis of this type now, although we mention
some possibilities. Neither do we consider the effects of a failure of the EU and UK to reach agree-
ment during transition. Many of these would be the same as the ‘No Deal’ analysis in our 2019
paper, with appropriate adjustments for the renegotiated provisions for Northern Ireland, as well
as for concurrent disruption to trade patterns and movement of people associated with
COVID-19. However, it will be very difficult to distinguish economic disruption from a No Deal
from that associated with COVID-19. We would also need to take into account the fact that the pas-
sage of time has meant greater preparedness for No Deal, on both the EU and the UK side. Many
aspects of contingency planning relevant to health were put in place for the original ‘Brexit Days’ and
these either remain in place or could be reactivated. Of course, all have cost implications.
3. Analysis and discussion
3.1 Health and social care workforce
The health workforce remains the most important challenge for the NHS post-Brexit. Although
the formal position of EU nationals working in the NHS has not changed during transition, the
move from ‘EU citizenship’ to ‘pre-settled’ and ‘settled status’, along with the ‘hostile environ-
ment’ that underpins the government’s migration policy has had a chilling effect, and many
EU nationals working within the NHS have already left, or are seeking to do so. Data from
the Nursing and Midwifery Council show that an inflow of nurses and midwives from the EU
into the UK until 2016 (which accounts for almost all the growth on the register from 2013 to
2016) has become a net outflow ever since (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2019). Although
there has been a significant increase in non-EU nationals, mainly from India and the
Philippines, joining the UK nursing workforce, overall numbers joining the register having
trained overseas remain below those in 2016 (Buchan et al., 2019). In November 2019, there
were over 100,000 vacancies across NHS England (The Health Foundation, The King’s Fund,
and Nuffield Trust, 2018), of which almost 44,000 were in nursing, representing 12% of the nurs-
ing workforce, according to the Health Foundation (Buchan et al., 2019). The Coronavirus Act
2020 allowed for emergency measures to plug some gaps, for instance drawing on health profes-
sional students and recently retired staff. Notwithstanding this, the extent and nature of existing
staffing gaps mean that the UK will be reliant on international health professionals for the fore-
seeable future, particularly in key areas, and especially in nursing. Visa extensions for some front-
line health workers were announced in April 2020, but do not cover many of the lowest-paid
health and social care workers across the UK.
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the importance to health of the social care sector,
which also faces growing staffing problems and has been especially reliant on EU migration.
Data for England show that vacancy rates in the sector have steadily risen to 8%. There would
be even more pressure without continued growth in the EU migrant workforce, which has
risen rapidly to 115,000 (Skills for Care, 2019). The potential for a dramatic exacerbation of
the situation if the end of free movement changes this has been widely commented on by
researchers: the UK Government Migration Advisory Committee noted that with no action on
wages in the sector ‘migrant workers will be necessary to continue delivering these services’
(Migration Advisory Committee, 2018, para. 5.31).
The EU and UK negotiating positions are consistent in that they reflect the ending of free
movement of people between the UK and EU, and repatriation of immigration control to the
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UK. Both sides envisage limited ‘mobility’ provisions, visa-free travel for short-term stays, and
arrangements for students, researchers and youth exchanges. COVID-19 measures are likely to
mean reduced human migration between countries in general, although migration of essential
staff, including NHS workers, will continue. The UK has offered concessions to international
NHS staff already in the UK as part of its adopted COVID-19 response, including temporary
changes to its ‘Tier 2’ immigration processes, which apply to NHS staffing. Obviously, outside
the EU, the UK will not be able to benefit from cross-border collaborations to share health work-
ers being developed to respond to disasters such as COVID-19.
Post-transition, the rules of the Common Travel Area (which allows free movement for British
and Irish citizens between the UK and Ireland) will continue to apply. None of the proposed
mobility provisions will replicate EU free movement law or the Withdrawal Agreement position.
Recruitment of EU nationals to the NHS workforce will be on the same basis as recruitment of
nationals from the rest of the world. The terms on which non-national NHS staff live and work in
the UK under the new EU−UK relationship will be significantly less secure than those for EU
nationals migrating within the EU, as they will be based only on UK domestic law. The lack
of detail on this makes it difficult to estimate how many who come to the UK will choose to
stay and work in the NHS following registration (Buchan et al., 2019).
The system planned for migrants from all other countries, European and non-European alike,
was laid out in February 2020 in a UK Government policy statement (HM Government, 2020e).
It uses a combination of shortage status, qualifications and salary to determine who can enter the
UK for work. The system would mean that migrants would be allowed to take up almost any pro-
fessional clinical role as long as that role is deemed to be in shortage, as they generally earn well in
excess of the absolute threshold of £20,480 per year. Without shortage status, which is reviewed
periodically and often subject to political intervention, some nurses and other clinicians outside
London may not qualify.
Migration for the vast majority of social care roles would be impossible regardless of any
shortages, as average pay is far below these levels, at around £16,200 per year in the predomin-
antly independent English sector (Skills for Care, 2019). These positions also do not require the
right level of qualifications. This has resulted in concern of exacerbating the already very difficult
situation in the sector that was exposed by COVID-19.
These UK measures are understood to be responding to the desire of the British public,
expressed in the EU referendum vote, to ‘take back control’ of domestic borders. However, the
National Centre for Social Research (What UK Thinks, 2020) suggests that the UK population
sees all health sector positions, no matter how lowly paid, such as ‘healthcare assistant’, as
‘skilled’; and that there is strong support (77% agree) for the new immigration system to prioritise
people coming to work for the NHS. Sixty-seven percent of those polled also felt that ‘care
worker’ is a ‘skilled’ job. These views have probably been strengthened by COVID-19.
Nonetheless, unless the direction of travel of UK immigration law and policy changes to reflect
this perception, given the likely outcome of the EU−UK negotiations on future relationship(s), it
is likely to become more difficult for the UK to recruit and retain EU nationals in the NHS and
social care workforce than it was pre-referendum. It is also worth noting the possible impact of
COVID-19 on perceived safety of working in frontline care in the UK. If COVID-19 deaths of
care and health workers are very high relative to other countries, this, in future could serve to
dissuade foreign nationals from considering such work here.
In at least two respects, however, we can expect the future EU−UK relationship(s) to facilitate
continued recruitment and retention of healthcare professionals. First, if agreement can be
reached, employment rights such as working time (discussed below) may be retained. Second,
both the EU (Council of the European Union, 2020, para. 43) and the UK (HM Government,
2020d, para. 48–9) seek a framework for the mutual recognition of qualifications, although the
EU’s position is that this is only where it is in the EU’s interest. Although the overall context
in which this part of the EU−UK Agreement will be found (services and investment) is likely
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to be modelled on a much less close trade relationship than EU membership (such as EU
−Canada, or EU−Japan), the key difference in the context of professional qualifications is that
the EU and the UK are beginning from common frameworks and current mutual recognition,
rather than building towards such a position. Although the new rules will not be enforceable
by individual health professionals, as under EU law, in practice individual enforcement is the
exception. The coordination of qualification rules through collaborative processes is more
important. Both the EU’s [European Commission, 2020b, para. SERVIN 1.14(2)] and the UK’s
(HM Government, 2020a, Articles 8.4 & 13.13) draft texts envisage a new institutional framework
for such coordination: a Specialised Committee on Trade/Trade in Services and Investment/
Sub-Committee on Recognition of Qualifications. In practice, this may result in a relatively
unchanged regulatory environment, unless the UK decides to depart significantly from medical
professional qualifications standards set by the EU. While most relevant professional organisa-
tions support alignment, some, such as the Royal College of Surgeons, suggest some changes
to domestic law would be desirable.
What will certainly change is the easy exchange of information between the EU and UK about
professionals providing medical services across borders where there are concerns about fitness to
practise, using the Internal Market Information (IMI) system. Running since 2008, the IMI is a
multilingual online tool through which national public authorities of the EU Member States
exchange information about the functioning of the internal market, including to improve profes-
sional mobility. By 2018, over 4000 alerts had been sent concerning disciplinary sanctions taken
against doctors, just over 30% of all alerts sent (European Commission staff working document,
2018). The UK has been one of the most frequent users of the system, reflecting the number of doc-
tors it employs from EU Member States. Although the IMI Regulation envisages the possibility of
access for third countries, this is under stringent conditions, including the application of EU law
in the relevant third country. No non-EEA country (not even Switzerland) currently has IMI access.
Unless the EU changes its position, exchange of data about medical professionals’ fitness to practise
will no longer be possible through IMI after the end of transition. This will mean that, unless
another agreement covers such information exchange, the UK will need to increase vigilance and
oversight of fitness to practise in order to maintain standards of patient care at pre-transition levels.
3.2 Financing
3.2.1 Reciprocal healthcare
In previous articles we highlighted the potential loss of reciprocal healthcare for people travelling
between the EU and the UK, and UK nationals who have retired to EU countries (Fahy et al.,
2017). Fortunately, agreement on some form of continued reciprocal healthcare arrangements
is a specific objective of both sides (HM Government, 2020d, para. 17–18; Council of the
European Union, 2020, para. 58), though this is one of the topics where the UK is seeking a sep-
arate side agreement rather than being part of the single integrated agreement sought by the EU,
creating the risk of dispute over form even if there is agreement on the substance.
The EU’s draft legal text includes detailed provisions in its draft Protocol on Social Security
Coordination, which largely mirror existing EU law in Regulation 883/2004, but with one notable
omission. While this draft text retains provisions to receive immediately necessary care while trav-
elling between the UK and the EU and would ensure continued healthcare coverage for UK
nationals who have retired to EU countries, it omits provisions for travel between the UK and
the EU for the purpose of receiving healthcare. This is also the case for the UK’s draft
Agreement on Social Security Coordination (HM Government, 2020c).
Agreement is likely to be reached on this topic, as the negotiating mandates are well aligned
(and have been detached from wider discussions around free movement of persons, which is the
basis for the regulations in EU law), and this will avoid most of the negative outcomes that we
identified in previous analysis. However, removal of provisions facilitating travel for the purpose
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of receiving care elsewhere takes away the ability of UK patients to seek care in a specialist centre
elsewhere in Europe, for example, or for UK pensioners now resident in Spain to return to the UK
to seek healthcare near to their families.
3.2.2 NHS financing
The EU has been a significant source of funds for infrastructure investment by the NHS, with the
European Investment Bank having provided it with over £3.3 billion in low-cost capital. Neither
negotiating mandate envisages continued UK participation in such EU financing structures,
which will reduce access to financing for infrastructure improvement. However, as we described
in our previous analysis, the greater impact on NHS finances is likely to come from the wider
long-term negative economic impact of leaving the EU. The COVID-19 pandemic changes the
wider economic context for the NHS and the economy as a whole. Quite how much impact leav-
ing the EU has on the economy in the short term will be bound up with the much wider impact
of the pandemic. The Government has mobilised sums of money to tackle the pandemic that
would have been unthinkable just a short while ago, but it is not yet possible to assess what
these will mean for the NHS, the wider economy, or the long-term public finances.
However, the negative impact on GDP of shifting the UK’s trading with the EU to a free trade
agreement will be permanent, as will its impact on funds available for the NHS and social care.
The Treasury’s Long-term economic analysis of EU exit in 2018 calculated that a typical free trade
agreement Brexit would result in UK GDP being between 4.9% and 6.7% less than it otherwise
would be after 15 years (HM Government, 2018). Though this is an uncertain area for forecasting,
the vast majority of studies similarly predict that the UK economy will be smaller, and many sug-
gest an even larger impact (Tetlow and Stojanovic, 2018). The UK in a Changing Europe has con-
cluded that any such reductions in projected GDP will feed directly into public spending, after the
end of contributions to the EU is taken into account (The UK in a Changing Europe, 2018).
As an illustration, taking current GDP of £2.2 trillion per year, the UK in a Changing Europe
methodology and the more optimistic Treasury estimates would imply a reduction of over £30
billion in annually available public spending. This would limit the ability of any government
to increase funding for the NHS, cover more people against the costs of social care, and invest
more in preventing disease.
3.3 Medical products and substances of human origin
The EU−UK agreement will cover trade in products, including pharmaceuticals, medical devices,
medical equipment [including personal protective equipment (PPE)], and consumables.
Substances of human origin (blood, plasma, human tissue and cells, human organs) are not con-
ceptualised as products in EU law, and are not explicitly mentioned in the negotiating positions.
Products made from substances of human origin will be included in the terms of the agreement.
As the main focus of the envisaged agreement is trade in products, this aspect of post-transition
will have the least effect on health and the NHS. One area that is likely to be secured is continued
access to medical isotopes [HM Government, 2020d, para. 25(d); Council of the European Union
2020, para. 85]. The expected outcomes are far from the potentially life-threatening effects on
supply chains associated with No Deal, but that is not to say that there will be no effects.
Trade in relevant products, and the components which are used to make those products, will con-
tinue post-transition on the basis of an agreement which goes some way – but not all the way – to
replicating the trade patterns that apply before the end of transition. The UK’s negotiating pos-
ition seeks to go further in this regard than the EU’s.
Both parties seek to secure a free trade area in goods: in other words, there will be no tariffs or
quotas restricting trade. But there will be a number of other hindrances, and these will impede
trade in the products that the NHS uses as much as any other sector. Hindrances include
rules of origin, possible anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties, and economic safeguards, to
6 Nick Fahy et al.
protect domestic producers. Although the agreement is likely to include ‘customs facilitation’
(measures to reduce ‘red tape’ at borders), there is no avoiding the need for significant changes
to the (electronic) paperwork needed for products, and components, coming from the EU
into the UK, and time taken to process them. The costs of these new processes are likely to be
passed on to consumers of the corresponding products, which in this case is the NHS. Both
independent research and the Government’s own modelling suggest a free trade agreement-type
relationship with the EU would increase costs of medicines, devices and equipment to the NHS
by around 5% – not as much as No Deal Brexit (7.5%), but a significant cost to the NHS budget,
estimated in November 2018 (Health and Social Care Committee, 2018) at £400 million per
annum.
Further, the EU−UK agreement will address ‘non-tariff barriers’ (measures other than direct
tariffs that have the practical effect of restricting imports or exports of goods or services). Here,
the UK and EU positions diverge to some extent, which makes it difficult to assess likely out-
comes and therefore implications for health and the NHS. One of the EU’s most impressive
achievements is the removal of these de facto hindrances to free trade, with consequent benefits
arising from economies of scale. In part, the EU has done this through deep cooperation in
setting safety standards, using European agencies, made up of experts from its Member States,
which agree standards that all EU countries can support. This system operates for medicines
licensing, and links to clinical trials regulation. The EU also has the CE system of automatic
recognition of the assessments of private standards entities that check conformity with technical
regulations, irrespective of where those bodies are established in the EU. This system operates for
medical devices and equipment. Compliance with these dense EU rules, and submission to
oversight and dispute settlement through EU or EEA institutions, secures access to the EU’s
market.
The UK’s negotiating position suggests that the UK seeks access to that market on terms better
than those, say, for Canada, but without consenting to the package of internal market law that the
EU insists is indivisible. In many respects, the UK’s negotiating documents are directly equivalent
to the EU−Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). But in a few, the
UK wants to go further, and some of these involve medicines, devices and medical equipment
(including PPE). For example, unless covered in the EU−UK Agreement, UK-based standards
entities will no longer be recognised by the EU post-transition. As such, for instance, firms mar-
keting medical devices in the EU will need a CE mark from an EU-based body. Further, under the
new Medical Devices Regulations, firms will also have to have an EU-based authorised represen-
tative who will be liable for defective devices along with the manufacturer, thus ensuring legal
redress by patients within the EU. The EU’s position refers only to cooperation with international
standards bodies, whereas the UK proposes detailed provisions on mutual acceptance of the
results of each other’s conformity assessments, including UK access to the EU’s electronic infor-
mation exchange systems for these administrative purposes [HM Government, 2020a, Annex 5A,
Article 5(1)]. The UK’s position is, in effect, to seek continuity post December 2020, by proposing
an automatic continuity of recognition of UK standard setting bodies’ ability to recognise com-
pliance with EU standards.
Another example is the UK’s proposed annex on medicinal products (HM Government,
2020a), for which there is no equivalent in the EU text. This annex aims to ‘reinforce competitive
market conditions based on principles of openness’ and ‘maintain cooperation to foster continued
mutually beneficial development in trade’ (italics added), suggesting a continuity that is absent in
the EU position. Alongside good manufacturing practice recognition (which is covered by trade
agreements like CETA), mutual recognition of pharmaceutical batch release control regulations
(based on the EU−Israel agreement on conformity assessment (Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and Their Member
States, of the One Part, and the State of Israel, of the Other Part, on Conformity Assessment
and Acceptance of Industrial Products, 2013) which covers some, but not all, pharmaceuticals,
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and which involves Israel aligning with EU rules), the UK position seeks to include mutual rec-
ognition of good clinical practice. Many UK-based companies supplying the health sector have in
fact already set up subsidiaries in the EU, so that they can ensure the compliance with EU stan-
dards and procedures, such as batch-testing of medicines, necessary to continue to supply the
larger EU market: the UK position of mutual recognition would make it easier for UK-based
companies to continue to supply that market. Furthermore, though exactly how access would
be arranged is left for subsequent technical discussions, the UK seeks continued sharing of infor-
mation about adverse post-market effects of new medicines (pharmacovigilance) and clinical
trials information, currently done through the European Medicines Agency, again neither of
which is covered by CETA.
By contrast, the EU does not seek agency-level arrangements in areas relevant to health and
the NHS, although the future EU−UK relationship is likely to continue some agency-level
cooperation (for instance in aviation, and nuclear energy). While in the EU, the UK was part
of a single licensing system for medicines marketed anywhere in the EU, based on a single clinical
trial system, applicable to all EU cross-border clinical trials. The EU’s position is that the UK, by
deciding to leave the internal market and eschew formal regulatory alignment with its rules, has
taken itself outside the clinical trials system processes, and their benefits. These benefits include
the ability to access larger patient populations (important for trials of medicines for rare diseases);
to sell to a large market without the costs of altering technical standards; and to respond to phar-
macovigilance information drawn from a large patient population. From the point of view of the
EU, the UK will not be able to be part of the processes overseen by the European Medicines
Agency, which relocated from London to Amsterdam on 1 March 2019, or the EU’s technical
standards processes for medical devices or equipment. Given the divergence of the positions,
the agreement is likely to require only that the UK and the EU work through international stan-
dards bodies, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
International Council on Harmonisation (ICH) (Flear, 2018).
That means, though, that the EU and the UK will each be permitted to require that products
sold in their markets meet their own safety standards. The Medicines and Medical Devices Bill
HC Bill (2019–21) [90], when it comes into force, will allow ministers to amend domestic law
on medicines and medical devices without primary legislation. The delayed conclusions of the
Cumberlege Review (Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review, 2020) on safety
of medicines and devices are likely to feed into decisions in this policy space. The Bill envisages
that the relevant executive authorities may amend all relevant areas of law currently regulated at
EU level, subject to a duty to pay attention to safety and availability of medicines and devices in
the UK, as well as ‘the attractiveness of … the UK as a place in which to conduct clinical trials or
supply human medicines’. The Bill has been welcomed by some industry actors, who see the
ability to avoid primary legislation as enabling the UK regulatory environment to respond
rapidly to technological change. Others are concerned about the costs of regulatory drift
from the EU, and especially about the lack of a time-limit on executive power in such broad
policy areas. Compliance with obligations in the EU−UK agreement will provide some
constraints on the UK’s and the EU’s ability to require regulatory standards higher than those
that currently apply without scientific justification, as to do so would introduce ‘non-tariff
barriers’, contrary to the agreement. But these obligations are mainly procedural: each party to
the agreement will retain power to determine its own safety and health standards. Because the
UK will be outside of the EU’s medicines licensing, clinical trials approvals and medical device
standards decision-making processes, it will be unable to influence these directly, except through
international bodies like the ICH. There will be no constraints on the UK adopting lower
standards than the EU’s, other than soft incentives to align with the larger EU market, and
the vague objective of convergence based on international standards. Non-alignment is likely
to mean increased costs in terms of regulatory compliance (as companies would have to show
compliance with two sets of processes and standards), and less UK bargaining power with the
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global industry. Those factors could mean that UK patients faced delays in access to innovative
medicines and vaccines.
Finally, the EU has used joint procurement processes, for instance for PPE, ventilators, and
laboratory equipment to respond to COVID-19 (European Commission, 2020c), as the
European Commission sought to do with swine flu vaccines in 2009, using its bargaining
power as a bloc. The UK belatedly indicated it would join that joint procurement for
COVID-19 in late March 2020: it will be unable to join similar initiatives post-transition. Also,
after December 2020, the UK would be subject to any export bans the EU imposes on essential
products. This may affect the UK’s ability to source medical equipment, medicines or vaccines
necessary to respond to a second wave of COVID-19 after that date. During the first wave the
EU banned the export without authorisation of face shields, masks and many other types of pro-
tective equipment for a period of six weeks (European Commission, 2020a).
3.4 Information
Three information dimensions of the EU−UK agreement are information exchange within the
EU’s internal market (discussed above); comparable data about health and health systems; and
regulation of data sharing, in particular protection of personal data.
One of the advantages of European cooperation is comparing and learning across countries,
and the EU’s comparative data is a key resource for doing so. The European statistical system
coordinated by EUROSTAT, the EU’s statistical office, is central, but neither the UK nor the
EU seeks for the UK to remain integrated within this system, which is likely to lead to divergence
of data over time and reduced comparability. Other specific mechanisms for collecting and shar-
ing comparable data include the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (the
ECDC). Data on COVID-19 illustrate the impact of this. While some data are available through
a variety of global sources, the ECDC is able to provide enhanced data through more in-depth
collection and reporting for the EU (and the UK, during the transition period). While the UK
will remain part of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and thus remain integrated within
the WHO’s data structures, these inevitably do not have the same degree of coverage or harmon-
isation as EU data systems. The EU’s draft legal agreement does also include the possibility of the
EU granting temporary access to its Early Warning and Response System (EWRS), which is a
system for sharing information and coordinating response between governments to public health
threats such as COVID-19, though it is not included in the UK’s negotiating position.
Both negotiating mandates envisage data protection rules being established autonomously by
the EU and UK, with each then allowing flows of personal data to the other provided that the data
protection rules of the other side are deemed to provide adequate protection (HM Government,
2020d, para. 59; Council of the European Union, 2020, para. 13). There will no longer be a com-
mon mechanism between the UK and the EU for the protection of personal data, nor any ambi-
tion to establish one. In the short term, this is unlikely to cause serious issues, but in the longer
term some divergence seems likely, with implications for cross-border trade in services requiring
the processing of personal data between the UK and the EU.
3.5 Service delivery
3.5.1 Working time legislation
The EU has emphasised the importance it attaches to a ‘level playing field’, which addresses
health and safety standards, including legislation on working time. The EU’s negotiating mandate
seeks a commitment that the UK’s labour standards will not be reduced below the level currently
required by EU law (Council of the European Union, 2020, para. 101), and will be effectively
enforced – which would mean that provisions on limiting working time could not be weakened
in the future, either in law or in practice. The UK’s negotiating position does not provide for a
similar non-regression provision. Rather, it envisages labour law being developed autonomously
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by both sides, with only a more general commitment not to reduce labour laws and standards ‘in
order to encourage trade or investment’ (HM Government, 2020d, para. 75).
These aims diverge, with the EU seeking guarantees that the UK will maintain labour law pro-
tections that currently exist, and the UK seeking the right to change them. What agreement is
reached will depend on the wider result of negotiations regarding the ‘level playing field’ sought
by the EU but rejected by the UK. If there is no agreement here, this may compound the effect of
more restrictive immigration rules by making employment conditions in the NHS and social care
less attractive than those elsewhere in the EU, making it harder to recruit staff from the EU than
otherwise. This may be particularly challenging for staffing in Northern Ireland. Irrespective of
agreement, UK domestic law or policy may de facto embed aspects of a level playing field: for
example, junior doctors in England have effectively secured continued application of the EU’s
working time rules via their contracts.
In the short term there is unlikely to be any immediate impact, as there are unlikely to be
immediate changes to labour law even if there is agreement on the UK’s scope to do so, or
No Deal. In the longer term, it seems likely that any agreement acceptable to the UK would
include scope to make longer-term changes to working time legislation, so the issue of what is
appropriate working time for junior doctors is likely to return.
3.5.2 Cross-border care
The situation with cross-border care is quite different for Northern Ireland and Great Britain.
Both negotiating mandates envisage continued UK participation in the cross-border PEACE
programmes between Northern Ireland and Ireland (a strand of the EU’s structural funds
specifically promoting cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland and the border
counties of Ireland), including their health elements. However, the more general provisions on
seeking, or providing, cross-border care (for rare diseases, for example) are not included in either
negotiating mandate. This includes the reciprocal healthcare arrangements described above, as
well as UK participation in cooperation frameworks such as the European Reference
Networks. There are also no specific provisions on the cross-border provision of services such
as telemedicine, or ‘back office’ services such as tele-radiology. The alignment of both sets of
negotiating mandates suggests that agreement is likely to be reached on this approach, meaning
that cross-border healthcare cooperation will continue for Northern Ireland but not for the rest of
the UK.
3.6 Leadership and governance
3.6.1 Global public health standards
Both the EU and the UK negotiating positions conceptualise public health matters as concerned
with food safety, animal, and plant health, as covered by the World Trade Organization
(WTO)’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. The EU−UK trade agreement will prevent
use of such standards to protect domestic markets, and require that both the UK and the EU
base such standards on scientific assessments, though a similar obligation has not prevented dis-
putes in the WTO context, for example about genetically modified food. The EU and the UK will
undertake to cooperate in relevant international fora, including through sharing information.
This arrangement will reduce the ability of health stakeholders to hold the UK government to
account, because these fora are less transparent than the EU, and because many of them, e.g.
WTO, do not prioritise health. Nothing in the EU−UK agreement will require the UK to
align with the EU’s standards, leaving the UK scope to adjust its public health regulation in
the future. The EU seeks control over safety standards for imported food. By contrast, the UK
seeks equivalence recognition along the lines of CETA or the EU’s draft text for an agreement
with New Zealand on veterinary standards (The Council of the European Union, 1997), which
would reduce border controls and certification. In this area there is a major complication as it
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is likely to be difficult to reconcile US demands for a future trade deal with the UK with those by
the EU.
There is no provision for cooperation on broader public health matters, such as tobacco regu-
lation or communicable disease control. The implication is that continued cooperation will take
place only within the framework of the WHO and other specialised agencies, where the UK’s soft
power as a relatively small state is likely to be diminished in comparison with its power as part of
a common EU voice.
3.6.2 Competition and trade
The UK and EU negotiating mandates are not compatible in terms of competition or state
aids rules. The UK seeks commitments only to transparency in state aids, and to maintain
competition laws. The EU seeks dynamic alignment (i.e. commitment to track EU standards)
on a range of ‘level playing field’ commitments, including state aids and competition law. The
lack of compatibility means outcomes are uncertain, and effects on health and the NHS
consequently impossible to predict. On public procurement, the UK does not want to go beyond
the minimal provisions of the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement. This would
mean that NHS England would no longer operate in the shadow of EU procurement require-
ments, which are felt to drive inefficient conduct in purchasing practices. However, outside the
EU’s trade structures, the UK’s scope for influencing the place of health in trade deals is
diminished.
3.6.3 Participation in research programmes
Both negotiating mandates make provision for continued UK participation in EU-funded
programmes as a third country, although the UK is only seeking participation in a relatively
narrow set of EU programmes. This includes the research programme and the PEACE pro-
grammes in Northern Ireland, but does not include other health-related programmes, such as
those financing European Reference Networks. The negotiations therefore seem likely to enable
continued participation by UK research entities in wider European research programmes and the
PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland, but not other activities with a more direct focus on
health.
3.6.4 Regulation of research
Participation in EU research programmes is only one aspect of the effects of the EU−UK agree-
ment on biomedical research, and consequent effects on health and the NHS. The regulation of
clinical trials is also important. This is complex, because it covers both cross-border trade in ser-
vices (the service of the research itself); trade in goods; and data sharing. Health-related services
are not explicitly covered in either negotiating text: despite the reality of many clinical trials, they
are not conceptualised as a cross-border service, like transport, in these negotiations. As explained
above, despite the political rhetoric of the Johnson government, the detail of the legal texts
suggests that the UK seeks continuity in mutual recognition of what will be separate regulatory
standards for ‘good clinical practice’, required to secure market access for medicines. The
UK’s position also implies ongoing data sharing using the EMA’s systems, whereas the EU
seeks a clean break in terms of such ‘internal market’ access. The divergence of positions
here makes it very difficult to determine likely outcomes. The EU’s position (and No Deal)
would mean UK and EU clinical trials approval processes would have to be run separately.
This raises concerns that the consequent increases in administrative burdens, especially if
divergence arises either through deliberate regulatory choices, or just because of lack of practical,
granular cooperation, will lead to reduced collaborative EU−UK research activity. The conse-
quence would be fewer trials and a reduction in patient access to new treatments in both the
EU and the UK.
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4. Conclusion
Health is not a central issue in these negotiations, but their outcome will still have a significant
impact on health. The largest direct impact on health and social care is likely to be on workforce,
with no provisions to facilitate free movement for those working in health or social care (and even
an agreement on mutual recognition of qualifications may not be that helpful in practice). One
major negative direct impact seems likely to be avoided, with agreement likely on continued
reciprocal healthcare arrangements avoiding UK citizens living in the EU being left at risk of lack-
ing healthcare, though facilities have been removed that enabled patients to seek healthcare in the
EU when needed. Direct disruption to health and social care in Northern Ireland also seems likely
to be minimised through continued participation in the PEACE programmes.
The largest impact overall is likely to come through the predicted negative impact on the future
economic growth of the UK, as described above, with those reductions in growth feeding through
into reduced capacity to fund health and social care alongside other public services. More broadly,
there is likely to be a progressive divergence of regulatory regimes related to health, with potential
longer-term impacts in areas such as availability of medicines and participation in biomedical
research. In particular concerning health-related products, the impact of the outcome of the negotia-
tions will turn on what overall agreement is reached (if any) that resolves the tension between
the UK’s desired de facto access to the EU’s internal market and the EU’s aims for a ‘level playing
field’.
The lack of health as a cross-cutting objective for these negotiations is disappointing, and in
the case of the EU is arguably a breach of its Treaty obligations to integrate health in all policies
(Article 9, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). From the UK perspective, as any
agreement reached with the EU will be the reference point for future UK trade agreements
(including with the United States), there is an opportunity to defuse tensions around standards
and threats to the NHS by including health as a regulatory ‘floor’ in these negotiations. This could
be achieved by including health-related protections as part of the ‘level playing field’ provisions
and including a commitment to maintaining at least the current levels of health protection within
the UK.
This assessment and avoiding negative impacts such as on cross-border care is provisional, and
the risk of No Deal remains. The likely immediate impact of No Deal on supply chains and
availability of key products is smaller than it would have been without the current transitional
period, as both governments and other actors have had time to put in contingency plans.
However, risks still exist; those plans are largely not publicly available and thus cannot be fully
scrutinised, and the COVID-19 pandemic has put all aspects of health and care systems and
wider society under immense strain, so there is even less slack to accommodate problems in
the event of No Deal.
Many issues are raised for health and care by the UK leaving the EU which go beyond the
scope of these negotiations. A new strategy is needed for ensuring appropriate health and care
staffing with much reduced migration from the EU. A new approach to regulation of pharmaceu-
ticals and other health-related products may also be needed, if the UK positions itself outside one
of the two principal global regulatory jurisdictions.
Finally, the continued lack of transparency around the negotiations and lack of involvement of
stakeholders raises serious concerns. The COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the need for cen-
tral government to be transparent to enable effective analysis and input from stakeholders, espe-
cially in a technical area such as health. For these negotiations and for the series of trade
negotiations that will follow in the years to come, it is vital to establish transparent processes
that enable scrutiny and broad-based stakeholder input throughout.
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Table 1 Summary of EU and UK negotiating positions and their implications for health
Key:
Column 2 Previous analysis of future relationship, based on political declaration:
Grey - broadly unchanged; Green - positive; Pink - moderate negative; Red - major negative
Column 5 Assessment of compatibility of aims:
Green - agreement likely; Yellow - unclear; Red - no agreement likely
Columns 7 Likely impact on health/NHS
Grey - broadly unchanged; Green - positive; Yellow – too uncertain to analyse; Pink - moderate negative; Red - major negative
1. WHO Building
blocks 2. Previous analysis 3. EU negotiating aims 4. UK negotiating aims 5. Compatibility
6. Likely outcome in
agreement
7. Likely impact
on health
Workforce
Recruitment and
retention of EU
nationals in the NHS
No provisions
facilitating recruitment
and retention of NHS
workers
Reciprocal rights and
obligations in free
movement
No provision for free
movement of people
Relatively
compatible
Restricted movement
of EU workers
Increased difficulty
in recruiting and
retaining NHS and
social care staff
Mutual recognition of
qualifications
Weak ambition for MR
of Quals
MR of Quals only ‘where
in the Union’s interest’
MR of Quals Relatively
compatible
Agreement in principle
on MR of Quals
Broadly unchanged
position
Employment rights
for health workers
FTAs do not typically
involve employment
rights
Employment standards
non-regression clause
Retain rights to modify
employment standards
Level of standards
likely to depend on
wider agreement
about trade and
‘level playing field’
Uncertain Uncertain
Financing
Reciprocal
healthcare
arrangements
Potential reciprocal
health-care
coordination
Reciprocal healthcare
arrangements, no
planned care abroad
Reciprocal healthcare
arrangements, no
planned care abroad
(separate agreement)
Continued reciprocal
healthcare
arrangements
Continued reciprocal
healthcare
arrangements
Continued reciprocal
healthcare
arrangements, no
planned care abroad
Capital financing for
the NHS
Probably less capital
financing than now
No provision No provision Compatible No provision Access to EIB stopped
and access to capital
financing reduced
Public spending Free trade agreement
likely to be associated
with lower GDP, though
less so than No Deal
Free trade agreement
likely to be associated
with lower GDP, though
less so than No Deal
Broadly
compatible
Significantly less public
funding on a
permanent basis than
would otherwise be
the case
(Continued )
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Table 1 (Continued.)
1. WHO Building
blocks 2. Previous analysis 3. EU negotiating aims 4. UK negotiating aims 5. Compatibility
6. Likely outcome in
agreement
7. Likely impact
on health
Medical products,
vaccines and
technology
Pharmaceuticals
and other medical
products
Potential for some
weaker cooperation
with EU on licensing
and regulation of
medicines than
currently
FTA for goods; TBT to
use international
standards regulatory
‘floor’; no UK
participation in
regulatory structures
FTA for goods; TBT
continued mutual
recognition of potentially
divergent standards;
continuity in UK
participation in technical
structures
Degree of technical
participation likely to
depend on wider
agreement about
trade
Continued UK access
to technical
mechanisms if there is
wider agreement on
UK-EU trade
Increased costs of
products associated
with FTA
Uncertain
Medical isotopes Provision for continued
supply from EU to UK
Provision for continued
supply from EU to UK
Provision for
continued supply
from EU to UK
Continued provision Continued access to
medical isotopes
Information
Comparable data
between the UK and
similar European
health systems
No specific
cooperation on health
information
No provisions to retain
UK data as part of EU
data systems
No provisions to retain
UK data as part of EU
data systems
No provisions to
retain UK data as
part of EU data
systems
No provisions Cooperation within
WHO; reduced
comparability of data;
loss of deeper
cooperation on health
information
Information
exchange
mechanisms on
health-related
aspects of free
movement and
substances of human
origin
No specific
cooperation on health
information
Scope for cooperation
where it is in the EU’s
interest
Mechanisms for some
continued information
exchange between the
EU and the UK related
especially to trade in
goods
Degree of
information sharing
likely to depend on
wider agreement
about trade
Continued UK access
to information
exchange mechanisms
for goods if there is
wider agreement on
UK-EU trade
Uncertain
Data protection No specific
cooperation on health
information
Data protection based
on EU law; adequacy
decision envisaged
Independent UK data
protection laws; UK
seeks adequacy decision;
UK recognises EU under
adequacy decision
Separate
autonomous data
protection regimes
Separate and
autonomous data
protection regimes
Short-term
compatibility but risk
of long-term
divergence with
implications for
cross-border services
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Service delivery
Working time
legislation
Employment standards
non-regression clause
Retain rights to modify
employment standards
Level of standards
likely to depend on
wider agreement
about trade and
‘level playing field’
Unclear Uncertain
Cross-border care Cross border health
services not envisaged
as part of future
relationship (except in
Ireland as part of
peace process)
Continued UK
participation in NI PEACE
programmes
Provision for UK
participation NI PEACE
programmes
UK participation in NI
PEACE programmes
No cross-border health
services for Great
Britain; continued in
Northern Ireland
Continued UK
participation in NI
PEACE programme, but
not other
health-related EU
programmes (eg:
European Reference
Networks)
Leadership and
governance
Public health Scarce or no
participation in ECDC
UK & EU autonomy to
regulate public health
UK & EU autonomy to
regulate public health
Agreement on
autonomy on public
health regulation
No substantive
standards on public
health in agreement
No short term change;
scope for the UK to
adjust public health
regulation in the future
Continued
collaboration on public
health at global level
Competition and
trade
NHS England no longer
in perceived shadow of
EU competition and
public procurement
law provisions
Dynamic alignment with
EU competition rules;
direct application of EU
state aid rules;
procurement based on
GPA+
Transparency on harmful
subsidies; no regulatory
alignment, but commit
to competition laws;
public procurement
excluded
Incompatible
regarding alignment
with EU competition
rules. Public
procurement rules
aims compatible
Unclear; key point in
negotiations
Uncertain
Scope to relax public
procurement rules for
NHS England
Reduced global
influence over health in
trade deals
Reduced global
influence for UK over
health in trade deals
Research Continued
participation in
research envisaged but
on worse terms for the
UK; loss of global
leadership and
influence
Provision for UK
participation in EU
programmes as a third
country
Provision for UK
participation in research
programme, but not
health programme
UK participation in
future research
programme, but not
other health-related
programmes
UK participation as
third country in some,
but not all,
health-related
programmes
Continued UK
participation in
research programmes,
but not other
health-related
programmes
(Continued )
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Table 1 (Continued.)
1. WHO Building
blocks 2. Previous analysis 3. EU negotiating aims 4. UK negotiating aims 5. Compatibility
6. Likely outcome in
agreement
7. Likely impact
on health
Regulation of
biomedical research*
Lack of shared
regulatory framework
impeding cross-border
research
Services provisions
envisage FTA-type
approach, not regulatory
alignment
No shared regulatory
approach for services,
but seeks de facto access
for eg clinical trials
No common
regulatory framework
for cross-border
research; technical
cooperation
depending on wider
agreement about
trade
Regulatory divergence;
continued UK access to
technical mechanisms
if there is wider
agreement on UK-EU
trade
Uncertain
Scrutiny and
stakeholder
engagement
Volume of new
legislation and
executive powers
under EU (Withdrawal)
Act, plus new trade
agreements, limits
scrutiny and
engagement
Risk of agreements
with a substantive
impact on health but
which are not subject
to normal processes of
Parl scrutiny (or
stakeholder
involvement)
* not in original table
16
N
ick
Fahy
et
al.
References
Buchan J, Gershlick B, Charlesworth A and Seccombe I (2019) Falling Short: The NHS Workforce Challenge. London: The
Health Foundation. Available at https://www.health.org.uk/publications/reports/falling-short-the-nhs-workforce-challenge.
Council of the European Union (2020) Directives for the Negotiation of a New Partnership with the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland ST 5870/20. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
European Commission (2020a) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/402 of 14 March 2020 Making the
Exportation of Certain Products Subject to the Production of an Export Authorisation OJ LI 77/1 of 15/3/2020.
Luxembourg: Official Journal of the European Union.
European Commission (2020b) Draft Text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom UKTF(2020)14.
Brussels: European Commission. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/200318-draft-agreement-gen.pdf.
European Commission (2020c) Guidance from the European Commission on Using the Public Procurement Framework in the
Emergency Situation Related to the COVID-19 Crisis 2020/C 108 I/01. Luxembourg: Official Journal of the European Union.
European Commission staff working document (2018) Assessment of Stakeholders’ Experience with the European
Professional Card and the Alert Mechanism Procedures SWD(2018)90. Brussels: European Commission.
Fahy N, Hervey T, Greer S, Jarman H, Stuckler D, Galsworthy M and McKee M (2017) How will Brexit affect health and
health services in the UK? Evaluating three possible scenarios. The Lancet 6736, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736
(17)31926-8.
Fahy N, Hervey T, Greer S, Jarman H, Stuckler D, Galsworthy M and McKee M (2019) How will Brexit affect health
services in the UK? An updated evaluation. The Lancet 393, 949–958. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30425-8
Flear M (2018) Charting a roadmap towards membership and formal voice in global bioethics standard-setting: health
research and the case of the International Council on Harmonisation. Medical Law International 18, 157–178. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0968533218804598.
Foundation, The Health, The King’s Fund, and Nuffield Trust (2018) “The health care workforce in England.” London.
Available at http://www.hee.nhs.uk/news-blogs-events/news/hee-launches-plan-future-proof-nhs-care-workforce.
Gleeson D and Labonte RN (2019) Trade agreements and public health : a primer for health policy makers, researchers and
advocates. Palgrave Studies in Public Health Policy Research. Basingstoke.
Health and Social Care Committee (2018) Oral evidence: impact of the Brexit withdrawal agreement on health and social
care, HC 1757. London.
Hervey T, Antova I, Flear M, McHale J, Speakman E and Wood M (2021) Health ‘Brexternalities’: the Brexit effect on
health and health care outside the UK. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Special issue.
HM Government. (2020d) The Future Relationship with the EU; The UK’s Approach to Negotiations CP211. London: HMSO.
HM Government (2018) EU Exit: Long-Term Economic Analysis Cm 9742. EU Exit – Long-Term Economic Analysis. London:
HMSO.
HM Government (2020a) Annexes to the Draft Working Text for a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the United
Kingdom and the European Union. London: HM Government. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/886015/DRAFT_Social_Security_Coordination_Agreement.pdf.
HM Government (2020b) Draft Working Text for a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom and
the European Union. London: HM Government. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/886010/DRAFT_UK-EU_Comprehensive_Free_Trade_Agreement.pdf.
HM Government (2020c) Draft Working Text for a Social Security Coordination Agreement between the United Kingdom and
the European Union and Its Member States. London: HM Government. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/886015/
DRAFT_Social_Security_Coordination_Agreement.pdf.
HM Government (2020e) The UK’s Points-Based Immigration System: Policy Statement (CP 220). London: HMSO. Available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-policy-statement.
Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review (2020) The independent medicines and medical devices safety
review – news. 2020. Available at https://www.immdsreview.org.uk/news.html.
Migration Advisory Committee (2018) EEA Migration in the UK: Final Report. London: Migration Advisory Committee (MAC).
Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/741926/Final_EEA_
report.PDF.
Nursing & Midwifery Council (2019) Mid-year update: 1 April – 30 September 2019. London. Available at https://www.nmc.
org.uk/about-us/reports-and-accounts/registration-statistics/.
Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and Their
Member States, of the One Part, and the State of Israel, of the Other Part, on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of
Industrial Products (2013) European Union: Official Journal of the European Union OJ L 1 of 4.1.2013.
Skills for Care (2019) The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England: September 2019. Leeds. Available at
http://www.skillsforcare.org.uk/stateof.
Tetlow G and Stojanovic A (2018) Understanding the economic impact of Brexit. London. Available at https://www.institutefor
government.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/2018%20IfG%20Brexit%20impact%20%5Bfinal%20for%20web%5D.pdf.
Health Economics, Policy and Law 17
The Council of the European Union 1997. Council decision 97/132/EC of 17 December 1996 on the conclusion of the agree-
ment between the European Community and New Zealand on Sanitary Measures Applicable to Trade in Live Animals and
Animal Products OJ L 57, 26.2.1997. Luxembourg: Official Journal of the European Union.
The UK in a Changing Europe. 2018. The economic consequences of the Brexit deal. London. Available at https://ukandeu.
ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-economic-consequences-of-Brexit.pdf.
What UK Thinks. 2020. “Migration and Freedom of Movement.” 2020.
Cite this article: Fahy N, Hervey T, Dayan M, Flear M, Galsworthy M, Greer S, Jarman H, McKee M (2020). Assessing the
potential impact on health of the UK’s future relationship agreement with the EU: analysis of the negotiating positions.
Health Economics, Policy and Law 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133120000171
18 Nick Fahy et al.
